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This Article offers a thoughtful comparison of the legal
educational systems of the United States and New Zealand.
The author highlights the significant differences between
these two legal educational systems by contrasting their
admissions policies, clinical programs, "law-and-economics"
electives, and staffing of required courses. Based on this
analysis, the author concludes that although U.S. law schools
are clearly "better," such superiority may have been achieved
at too high of a cost, in terms of both the substantial
resources now devoted to legal education which could
otherwise be applied to alternative uses and the problematic
effects of the stratified legal educational system on the
overall social structure of the United States. He suggests that
U.S. legal education reformers should devote more attention
to formulating and assessing possible alternative legal
educational systems of a less expensive and more egalitarian
nature.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, U.S. legal education has been subjected to
broad-ranging criticism. I  Various observers have called for
substantial changes to be made in core and elective curricula,
2
legal writing programs, 3 clinical and other "skllls"-training
programs, 4 instruction in values and ethics,5 admissions criteria,
6
financial aid programs,7 faculty recruitment and evaluation
policies,8 and other aspects of law school operation. To one
considering these issues from a purely domestic perspective, It
would seem that virtually all of the foundational assumptions of
the legal education enterprise are now being re-examined. If one
1. See, e.g.. Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1921 (1993);
Symposium, Civic and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1525 (1993); Symposium,
The Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 277 (1992); Legal
Education and Professlonal Development-An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A.
SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR [hereinafter the McCrate Report]; Robert
A. Stein, The Future of Legal Education, 75 MIN. L. REV. 945 (1991); A. Kenneth Pye,
Legal Education In an Era of Change: The Challenge, 1987 DuKE L.J. 191 (1987);
Barry Boyer & Roger Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research
and Reform, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 221 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 1, at 958-59; Pye, supra note 1. at 197-200;
Leslie Bender, Hidden Messages in the Required First-Year Law School Curriculum, 40
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 387 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Natalie A. Markham, Bringing Journalism Pedagogy Into the
Legal Wring Class, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551 (1993).
4. See, e.g., the McCrate Report, supra note 1 (studying the issue of preparing
law graduates for practice).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
7. See, e.g., td.; Pye, supra note 1, at 193-95.
8. See, e.g., Pye, supra note 1, at 195-97; Graham C. Lilly, Law Schools
Without Lawyers? Winds of Change in Legal Education, 81 VA. L. REV. 1421. 1468-70
(1995).
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approaches legal education issues from an international
perspective, however, it becomes apparent that these
controversies rest on a basis of shared implicit premises that
themselves merit close scrutiny, but that are rarely, if ever, called
into serious question.
One can gain valuable insights concerning these implicit
premises by comparing U.S. legal education with that of any of
the world's other nations, particularly those industrialized nations
that face similar economic and social problems. There exists
recent English-language literature of modest scope that describes
the legal education framework and practices followed in a number
of foreign countries, and to some extent, compares the U.S.
approach with those approaches taken by legal educators in
various other nations. 9 Much can be learned from this literature,
although most of it is almost purely descriptive and lacks
analytical depth. As far as I am aware, however, no one has
attempted to broadly compare U.S. legal education to that of New
9. The following citations are listed in the alphabetical order of the foreign
countries focused upon in the articles. See. e.g., Ross Nankivell, Legal Education In
Australia, 72 OR. L. REV. 983 (1993); John Wade, Legal Education In Australia-
Anomie, Angst and Excellence, 39 J. LEGAL EDUc. 189 (1989); Joe Verhoeven &
Henri Simonart, Legal Education and Training in Europe: Belgium, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL
PROF. 45 (1995); John E.C. Brierley, Legal Education in Canada, 72 OR. L. REv. 977
(1993); H.J. Glasbeek & R.A. Hasson, Some Reflections on Canadian Legal Education.
50 MOD. L. REv. 777 (1987); Tom Latrup-Pedersen, Legal Education and Training In
Europe: Denmark, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 79 (1993); Sandra R. Klein, Note, Legal
Education in the United States and England: A Comparative Analysis, 13 LoY. L.A.
INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 601 (1991); Clive Walker, Legal Education in England and Wales,
72 OR. L. REv. 943 (1993); Jean-Claude Masclet et al., Legal Education and Training
in Europe: France, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 7 (1995); Eckart Klein, Legal Education in
Germany, 72 ORE. L. REV. 953 (1993); Hilmar Fenge et al., Legal Education and
Training in Europe: Germany, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 95 (1995); Juergen R. Ostertag,
Legal Education in Germany and the United States-A Structural Comparison. 26
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1993); Katalln Koliath & Robert Laurence, Teaching
Abroad. Or, 'What Would That Be in Hungarian'. 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 85 (1993); Francis
A. Gabor, Legal Education in Hungary, 72 OR. L. REv. 957 (1993); Thomas O'Malley,
Legal Education and Training in Europe: Ireland, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (1995);
Constance O'Keefe, Legal Education in Japan, 72 OR. L. REV. 1009 (1993); Jaap E.
Doek, Legal Education and Training in Europe: The Netherlands, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF.
25 (1995); C. Nicholas Revelos, Teaching Law in Transylvania Notes from a Dfferent
Planet, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 597 (1995); George A. Critchlow, Teaching Law in
Transylvania Notes on Romanian Legal Education, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1994);
Lisa A. Granik, Legal Education in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, 72 OR. L. REv. 963
(1993); Alexander J. Black, Separated by a Common Law: American and Scottish
Legal Education, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 15 (1993); Joanne Fedler, Legal
Education in South Africa, 72 OR. L. REV. 999 (1993); Richard de Friend, Legal
Education and Training in Europe: United Kingdom, 2 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 119 (1995).
See also John Henry Merryman, Legal Education Here and There: A Comparison, 27
STAN. L. REv. 859 (1975).
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Zealand.10  Such a comparison is long overdue. New Zealand's
legal system reflects a very interesting adaptation of British legal
institutions to unique local circumstances. Moreover, the legal
education system that has evolved to train attorneys to fulfill the
roles defined by those institutions provides an excellent
background for framing certain central, but often overlooked,
features of the U.S. approach.
There are significant differences between the legal education
provided in the United States and that of New Zealand. These
contrasts provide a valuable perspective from which the
distinctive aspects of the U.S. approach can be better understood
and assessed. This Article describes and discusses some of these
contrasts and sets forth my views concerning the insights they
provide regarding usually unacknowledged trade-offs inherent in
the legal education enterprise, and the implications of those
insights for legal education reform efforts.
Part II identifies and comments briefly on some of the more
obvious structural differences between the two systems of legal
education. Part III will then focus in more detail upon several
more specific contrasts: admissions policy, clinical education,
"economic analysis of law" electives, and staffing of required
courses. Finally, Part IV offers some brief conclusions concerning
the insights that U.S. legal educators can obtain from reflecting
upon the New Zealand experience. In brief, I conclude that if one
considers U.S. legal education against the backdrop of the New
Zealand experience, it suggests the interesting and somewhat
disturbing possibility that while U.S. law schools are better than
those of New Zealand-and likely the finest in the entire world-
this excellence may have been achieved at too high a social cost.
These costs include both the economic resources devoted to the
law school enterprise, as well as the more intangible social costs
stemming from the contribution our educational approach makes
towards reproducing and reinforcing a stratified social structure.
10. Some recent articles discuss certain aspects of New Zealand legal
education and incorporate perspectives derived from the U.S. experience, but these
authors had other objectives and fall short of providing comprehensive comparative
assessments. See, e.g., Peter Spiller, The History of New Zealand Legal Education: A
Study in Ambivalence. 4 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 223 (1993); Sir Kenneth Keith, The Impact
of American Ideas on New Zealand's Educational Policy, Practice and Theory: The Case
of Law, 18 VIcTORIA UNIV. OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 327 (1988); D. Craig Lewis,
Observationsfrom an Outsider, 3 CANT. L. REV. 347 (1988); Geoffrey Palmer, Legal
Education Down Under, 1983 SYLLABus 14; R.G. Hammond, Some Proposals with
Respect to Legal Education In New Zealand, 9 N.Z. UNIv. L. REV. 28 (1980).
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II. BASIC STRUCTURAL CONTRASTS
The United States obviously has a much larger legal
education system than does New Zealand. There are now 178
American Bar Association-accredited law schools in the United
States that grant J.D. degrees," collectively employing slightly
more than 5,000 full-time law faculty, as well as several thousand
more deans and other administrators, part-time adjunct faculty,
and supporting staff persons. 12 There are about 135,000 law
students enrolled in those law schools at any one time. 13 The
New Zealand legal education system, in contrast, consists of only
five medium-sized law schools, each based within a public
university,14 with a combined total of approximately 123 full-time
faculty on staff15 and about 2,500 students enrolled at any given
time.16
The U.S. legal education system is therefore roughly 50 times
as large as the New Zealand system in terms of the number of
full-time faculty employed and students enrolled. However, the
United States has about 70 times the population of New
Zealand. 17  Therefore, somewhat surprisingly, New Zealand
11. A Review of Legal Education In the United States, 1995 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL
EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 67 [hereinafter Review of Legal Education]. Four law
schools-District of Columbia School of Law, Roger Williams University, Texas
Wesleyan University and Seattle University School of Law-operate under
provisional ABA approval, and 37 law schools are not approved by the ABA. Id. at
14, 53, 58, 62, 64-65.
12. Id. at 67.
13. Id. at 66.
14. The five New Zealand law schools are the University of Auckland School
of Law (located within the University of Auckland), the University of Canterbury
School of Law (located within the University of Canterbury), the University of Otago
Faculty of Law (located within the University of Otago), the University of Waikato
School of Law (located within the University of Waikato), and the Victoria University
of Wellington School of Law (located within the Victoria University of Wellington).
15. The University of Auckland School of Law has 33 full-tlime faculty
members, the University of Canterbury School of Law has 21, The University of
Otago Faculty of Law has 24, The University of Waikato School of Law has 20, and
the Victoria University of Wellington School of Law has 25. Spiller, supra note 10, at
243 n.106. In addition, the Massey University Department of Business Law-not
located within a law school-has an additional eight full-time faculty members. Id.
16. There were a combined total of 837 law graduates from the New Zealand
universities in 1995: 240 at the University of Auckland, 137 at the University of
Canterbury, 170 at the University of Otago, 140 at the University of Waikato, and
150 at the Victoria University of Wellington. COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION, REvIEW OF
PRACTICAL LEGAL TRAINING IN Nrv ZEALAND 58 (1995). Since the law student
populations are distributed rather evenly over the second-year, third-year, and
fourth-year classes at each of the schools, the approximate total number of law
students enrolled at any given time is 2,500.
17. The current population of New Zealand is approximately 3.59 million.
STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, NEv ZEALAND IN PROFILE (1996). The current U.S.
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actually has more law professors and law students per capita
than the supposedly over-lawyered United States. However, a
somewhat smaller proportion of New Zealand law school
graduates later go on to become practicing lawyers than do law
school graduates in the United States, so the annual number of
new practicing lawyers produced, per capita, is roughly the same
in the two nations.
Second, in the United States the basic law school curriculum
is now a three-year course of study designed for students who
already have a college degree,1 8 whereas in New Zealand-as well
as in most of the rest of the world, Canada excepted-the basic
law school training provided by universities is a four-year
undergraduate degree. As a result, U.S. law schools have a very
different student body than do the New Zealand law schools in
terms of the students' age profile, academic background, and
general level of maturity and experience.
Third, most U.S. law schools are private rather than publicly-
funded institutions, 19 whereas the five New Zealand law schools
are all located within public institutions. Private law school
tuition fees in the United States are much higher than those
charged by the New Zealand law schools. At the Southern
Methodist University School of Law (SMU), for example, the
annual charge for tuition and fees for the 1996-97 academic year
is slightly above $20,000,20 which is actually a bit below the
average for comparable high-quality private U.S. law schools,
2 1
but is more than 14 times as much as the amount New Zealand
law schools charge their students.2 2 Perhaps partly because of
the high tuition charged by their private school competitors, the
population is approximately 263 million, roughly 70 times as large. COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 315 (1996).
18. For an interesting and instructive history of the evolution of the post-
graduate structure of American legal education, see generally ROBERT STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850'S TO THE 1980's (1983).
19. Of the 178 ABA-approved law schools in the United States, 102 of them
are private schools. See Review of Legal Education. supra note 11, at 4-63.
20. SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF CASHIER, FINANCIAL
INFORMATION 1996-97 (1996).
21. For example, the annual tuition and fees charged by the Emory, Tulane
and Vanderbilt law schools were $20,700, $22,076, and $20,963 respectively for the
1996-97 academic year. EMORY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW; INFORMATION AND
APPLICATION VIEW BOOK, 1996-97 (1996); TuLANE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, SCHOOL
CATALOGUE 1996-97 (1996); VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, VIEW BOOK,
1996-97 (1996). The prestigious Yale Law School's tuition and fees were $22,692.
YALE LAW SCHOOL, FINANCIAL AID BROCHURE, 1996-97 (1996).
22. For the 1996 New Zealand academic year (February-November), the
annual tuition and fees charged by the New Zealand law schools were approximately
NZ $1,900, which is equivalent to $1,330. Conversations with Stuart Anderson,
Dean, University of Otago Facility of Law (January 1996).
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better quality public law schools in the United States generally
charge substantial tuition of approximately $5,000 or more per
year for in-state students and $12,000 to $19,000 or more per
year for out-of-state students. 2 3  While these public school
charges are considerably lower than private school tuition and
fees, they still far exceed the costs of New Zealand law schools
and amount to a significant sum for most individuals and their
families, especially after having already paid the substantial costs
of an undergraduate education.
This great disparity in law school tuition between the two
countries has differential impacts upon both the composition and
the attitudes of the law student population. One obvious effect of
the high U.S. tuitions is to disproportionately screen out
academically qualified potential applicants from less wealthy
social backgrounds, except to the extent that these applicants can
obtain sufficient scholarship assistance or are willing and able to
draw heavily upon public or private sources of loan assistance.
Having to spend $50,000 or more over three years on tuition
alone also tends to affect the attitude of those students enrolled in
private institutions. U.S. law students that are enrolled in such
institutions more serious about their studies than are their New
Zealand counterparts, even after allowing for the differences in
age profile and socio-economic background. Even those U.S. law
students enrolled in public institutions as in-state students have
made quite a significant financial commitment to their legal
training, at least several times that required of New Zealand
students, and consequently, they generally have a more focused,
vocational orientation. U.S. law students seldom regard law
school as merely a socially acceptable way of marking time in a
congenial college community before having to shoulder adult
responsibilities, or as simply a further extension of their liberal
arts education before later choosing a professional vocation. Most
of them intend to, and do, become practicing lawyers. New
Zealand law students, in contrast, are much younger than their
U.S. counterparts and have not had to make comparable financial
sacrifices to continue their education. They are thus often less
committed to the goals of mastering their studies and entering
into the practice of law and commonly regard their degree
programs much like many U.S. undergraduates pursuing
23. For example, the University of Texas School of Law charges $5,500 per
year tuition and fees for Texas residents, and $12,000 for out-of-state residents, the
University of California at Berkeley charges $10,800 and $19,200, and the
University of Iowa charges $5,166 and $14,020. UNIVERSITY OF TExAs AT AUSTIN
SCHOOL OF LAW, APPLICATION AND BULLETIN, 1996-97 (1996); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT BERKELY SCHOOL OF LAW, ANNOUNCEMENT, 1996-97 (1996); UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
COLLEGE OF LAW, TUITION AND FEES AND FINANCIAL AID INFORMATION, 1996-97 (1996).
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business, social science, or liberal arts majors-as general
training for entry into the larger business world.
Finally, there is an obvious and pronounced stratification
among U.S. law schools with regard to their academic reputations
and the professional and social opportunities available to their
graduates. Law school rankings are regularly published in media
outlets ranging from academic journals 24 to the popular press.25
Many persons affiliated with these schools take these rankings
relatively seriously, if only because of their concerns as to the
influence of such rankings upon prospective applicants, although
they often feign an attitude of indifference or even disdain. The
strong correlation between the range of subsequent social and
professional opportunities for law school graduates and the
generally perceived status of their school is so clear as to be
beyond reasonable doubt.
This is simply not the case in New Zealand, where the law
schools are generally regarded as roughly on par with one another
in academic and social terms. There is nothing in New Zealand
legal education at all resembling the intense student competition
for places in the top-tier U.S. law schools, or the relentless faculty
competition for positions at those schools and publication in their
law journals. This contrast is quite striking to one accustomed to
taking the pronounced hierarchical stratification of U.S. legal
education for granted.
One result of this pervasive U.S. competition for affiliation
with as prestigious a law school as possible is that the talent level
of students (and, to some extent, faculties and authors published
in the school-sponsored journals as well) is much more
homogeneous within any particular school than is the case in
New Zealand. Each U.S. school draws its students, faculty, and
journal authors to a large extent from that relatively narrow talent
stratum of persons who can just barely qualify for affiliation with
that institution in some capacity, but not with more prestigious
institutions, and the pecking order among schools that defines
the contours of these academic niches is relatively stable over
time. There consequently are, however, relatively large
differences between the average quality of student bodies (and,
arguably, faculties and published authors as well) at the different
tiers of law schools. These significant differences in the academic
and social environments in which aspiring young lawyers are
trained and socialized for their later professional roles in this
24. Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty
Scholarshp Survey, 70 CHI. KENT. L. REv. 1445 (1995).
25. Ted Gest, America's Best Graduate Schools: Law Schools, U.S. NEVS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1996, at 82-86.
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country have far-reaching social implications. These stratification
effects are completely absent from the New Zealand legal
education system, where prospective student and faculty
application decisions are driven largely by geographical
preferences and other personal factors unrelated to relative
institutional status.
Those are the most basic structural contrasts between the
two legal education systems. Taken together, they emphasize the
central fact that the U.S. approach to legal education is based
upon delivering graduate-level, high-cost education through a
relatively stratified system of schools that differ markedly in the
academic, economic, and social characteristics of their faculties
and student bodies, and requires a very major financial
commitment on the part of most of the students. Our legal
education system thereby demands not only a very substantial
social commitment of economic resources, both in aggregate and
per student terms, but also to some extent reproduces and
reinforces existing social class stratifications. It does so by, first,
segregating faculty and student populations in a hierarchical
fashion on the basis of academic ability and financial capability,
and second, by fostering relationships and group identities within
a given school, or within a set of schools perceived as belonging to
a particular tier, rather than across these segregated groups. In
these regards, the U.S. approach differs dramatically from the
legal education model followed in New Zealand and most of the
rest of the world as well.
A very strong argument can be made that the U.S. legal
education system, despite its recognized shortcomings,2 6
produces law school graduates that are better trained to practice
law and discharge the many other duties that often fall to
attorneys than are the graduates of the New Zealand law schools,
or for that matter the graduates of any legal education system in
the world that is based upon a four-year undergraduate law
degree program. It could hardly be otherwise, given the much
more demanding academic pre-requisites for admission, and given
the far greater resources marshalled by the law schools both in
aggregate terms and on a per student basis.
It is a much closer question, however, whether the
educational advantages of the U.S. system are sufficient to justify
the high economic costs and problematic social consequences of
its expensive, stratified system of graduate school training.
Reasonable persons may disagree on whether the trade-offs
incurred in taking this approach, rather than the less costly and
more egalitarian approach taken by New Zealand and most other
26. See sources cited supra notes 1-8.
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nations, result in net social benefits. Any conclusions reached in
this regard should take into account that in New Zealand a
significantly greater proportion of the social costs of legal
education are covered by public subsidies, rather than private
tuition as in the United States. As a result, when the net social
costs per graduate in the two systems are compared, the cost
advantage of the New Zealand system is far less dramatic than a
mere comparison of average tuition rates would suggest.
III. SOME SPECIFIC COMPARISONS
Several additional specific differences between the two
approaches to legal education are particularly interesting and
revealing. These include contrasts in admissions policy, clinical
education, the availability of law-and-economics elective courses,
and the method of staffing large required courses.
A. Admissions Policy
The two legal education systems follow quite different
approaches in selecting their students. One would expect this to
be the case, of course, when comparing graduate and
undergraduate programs. In the New Zealand system, there is
virtually open admission to the universities for all high school
graduates. Admission to law school is an internal university
process that takes place at the beginning of the second
undergraduate year. This admissions process is competitive and
based primarily upon student performance on a first-year legal
system survey course offered at each university. This course is
generally open to all entering undergraduates. 27
In the U.S. system, in contrast, students are competitively
selected for admission by law schools from their applicant pools
based primarily upon the students' undergraduate transcripts,
application essays, letters of recommendation, and scores earned
on a national, predominently multiple-choice Law School
Admissions Test (LSAT). Other factors such as ethnic diversity
objectives and alumni relations often play a part as well. U.S. law
27. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO, FACULTY OF LAW HANDBOOK 10 (1996);
UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, SCHOOL OF LAW STUDENT HANDBOOK 59
(1996). At least one of the New Zealand law schools no longer offers open
.enrollment to all students for the introductory legal systems course, and students
are competitively selected for the opportunity to enroll in that required law
prerequisite from an excess of applicants that is more than double the existing
classroom capacity. UNIvERSrrY OF AUCKLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, SCHOOL OF. LAW
STUDENT HANDBOOK 57 (1996).
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schools have real difficulties in making these admissions
decisions in a principled and reliable fashion. It is a common
practice for admissions officers to simplify the selection process
by first having the national Law School Data Assembly Service
(LSDAS) calculate a numerical index score for each applicant-
usually based upon an algorithm that gives roughly equal weight
to their undergraduate grade-point average and LSAT score-as a
first classificatory step on the basis of which many, if not most,
applicants are summarily accepted or rejected. For the remaining
applicants, the admissions officers (and,. in some institutions,
faculty as well) then take into account various other
considerations, such as applicant essays and recommendations,
ethnic and other diversity objectives, alumni relations concerns,
and applicant financial capability, in a more individualized
fashion. SMU, for example, which annually receives over 2,000
applications each year for about 250 places in the first-year class,
initially classifies the applicants into one of three categories
(admit/further review/reject) on the basis of a weighted index of
undergraduate grades and LSAT score and then engages in closer
scrutiny of the "further review" collection of applicant files to
make the remaining admissions decisions. 28
Obviously, much individual applicant information is
overlooked in making such aggregate quantitative preliminary
assessments. First of all, the undergraduate universities that
students have attended differ greatly in quality and in their
grading criteria. The undergraduate programs pursued by the
different applicants also vary greatly in difficulty. Finally, the
LSAT has well-known cultural biases and other limitations as a
predictor of future professional success that make it dubious to
rely so heavily upon it in assessing applicants. As a result of
these difficulties, the U.S. law school admissions process is
concededly rather subjective, and admissions officers make
numerous Type I errors (admitting students whose later law
school and career performance indicate that they should have
been denied) and Type II errors (denying students whose later
performance elsewhere indicates they should have been
admitted). Moreover, given the stratification of law schools and
the consequent differential access to academic experiences and
subsequent professional and social opportunities, the adverse
consequences for a student who is denied admittance to a
particular school that should have accepted her and has to attend
a lower-tier school can be long-lasting, if not permanent.
28. I am familiar with these SMU procedures from the recent years that I
have spent as both Chairman and as a member of the SMU law faculty committee
overseeing the admissions process.
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The New Zealand law school admissions system compares
quite favorably to these procedures in terms of admitting the most
academically qualified of the applicants. Most college students
there have the opportunity to take a legal systems survey
course,2 9 and those students admitted to law school on the basis
of their performance in that course have demonstrated their
ability to handle law school course work.30 New Zealand law
school admissions officers are thus largely spared from having to
infer applicant capabilities for the study of law on the basis of
grades of uncertain merit achieved in courses with perhaps only a
tangential relation to law or on the basis of a single time-
pressured, predominantly multiple-choice test.
3 1
B. Clinical Education
The second specific difference involves the different
approaches taken toward providing clinical education
opportunities in the two countries. I think the U.S. approach
provides better opportunities for the students than that followed
in New Zealand, although I appreciate the nature of the
constraints that make it difficult or impossible for New Zealand
law schools to implement that approach.
29. But see supra note 27.
30. It should be recognized that the New Zealand commitment to a
multicultural society is reflected in a system of express quotas for law school
admission which abridge the principle of selection on the basis of academic merit,
and by which a certain representation of various minorities in law school is assured.
For example, the University of Auckland School of Law selects 425 students from
the approximately 900 applicants for enrollment in the first-year legal systems
course. Of that number 331 are selected solely upon academic criteria, but up to 49
places are allocated to Maori applicants, including five places for mature Maori
applicants who need not pass even the minimal general entrance examination
criteria, up to 20 places for indigenous "Pacific Island" residents, up to three places
for disabled students, and up to two places for international students.
Two hundred seventy students from this group of 425 legal systems enrollees
are later selected at the beginning of the second undergraduate year for formal
admission into the law school, with 201 places to go to the best qualified students,
but up to 32 places are held for Maoris, up to 13 places for Pacific Islanders, up to
two places for disabled students, and up to two places for international students.
UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, SCHOOL OF LAW STUDENT HANDBOOK 57-60
(1996). The other New Zealand law schools apply comparable affirmative action-
type quota criteria as well when selecting among second-year applicants to their
programs.
31. It would be quite interesting if something analogous to the New Zealand
admissions approach could be implemented in U.S. legal education, but it does not
appear feasible to do so. Our law schools are not in a position to require a "legal
systems" undergraduate course of all of their applicants, who come from a very
broad range of colleges and universities, and even if they could do so the severe
comparability problems between graduates of different undergraduate schools
would remain.
[Vol. 30:31
19971 COMPARING UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND LEGAL EDUCATION 43
The U.S. legal education system is characterized by almost
universal law school sponsorship of faculty-supervised clinics
through which students represent clients pro bono on a variety of
civil and criminal matters. The clinical program at SMU is a fairly
typical example. 32 That law school has about 750 J.D. students
enrolled at any one time and approximately 40 full-time faculty on
staff. The school operates a civil clinic, a criminal clinic, and a
tax clinic. The clinical staff includes two full-time civil clinicians,
one full-time criminal clinician, two part-time adjunct criminal
clinicians, one part-time adjunct civil clinician, and one part-time
adjunct tax clinician. SMU has thereby committed a total of three
full-time faculty slots to the clinics-about 7.5% of the full-time
faculty-as well as some additional funds for the adjunct
clinicians and the other support staff and office supplies.
The clinicians at SMU generally do not teach any regular
non-clinic electives, but together they supervise about fifty clinical
students per semester. 33 The students enrolled in these clinics
conduct client interviews, engage in discovery for litigation, draft
and file pleadings and motions, and make court appearances-
including jury and non-jury trials-under faculty supervision.
The clinicians also, among other activities, hold "skills"
development sessions for their students, review and discuss their
written and advocacy performances, and oversee student
preparation of journals and summaries of their experiences.
There is therefore a definite "academic" component to the
clinic experience meshed with the practical training. The
students generally regard their clinical work as quite valuable for
their development of legal skills. It has proven to be a particularly
valuable experience for a significant set of students who are
disenchanted with theoretical classroom courses after almost
twenty years in school, but who are motivated and often excel
when given the opportunity to engage in activities with immediate
real-world consequences.
In New Zealand, there generally are opportunities for
students to do voluntary clinical work with off-campus legal
organizations, 34 and this fact is generally called to their attention
32. That school, however, may be somewhat atypical of U.S. law schools in
that it has a unitary tenure-track system for both clinicians and non-clinical faculty,
and it has different tenure-track faculty members directing each of the civil and
criminal clinics.
33. This number includes about 25 civil clinic students, 15 criminal clinic
students, and 10 tax clinic students per semester. The students enrolled in the
criminal clinic during a given semester receive six academic credits, the civil clinic
students receive five credits, and the tax clinic students receive four credits.
34. For example, at the University of Otago Faculty of Law students have the
opportunity to do volunteer work with the Dunedin Community Law Centre or the
Ngai Tahu Maori Law Centre, and this fact is called to their attention by the law
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by the law school catalogues. 3 5 No academic credit, however, is
given for this work, and no faculty supervision is provided to
ensure that any clinical experience has a "academic" component
to it. The post-graduate, one-semester Institute for Professional
Legal Studies course required for bar admission in New Zealand
3 6
is not comparable to a typical U.S. clinical course, since it is
essentially a classroom course focusing on teaching basic
transaction documentation and routine litigation procedures and
it is not designed to serve as a "hands-on" clinical experience. 37
My conclusion as to why the New Zealand law schools have
not embraced the idea of law school-sponsored clinical instruction
is that, while such clinics would obviously provide valuable
experience for their students and their establishment has been
recommended by knowledgeable outside observers,3 8 they would
present several significant problems for the law schools' faculties
and deans.
First, there is the cost. A law school clinic is very resource-
intensive per student credit-hour when compared to most
classroom lecture instruction (although perhaps not when
compared with smaller seminar classes) since the nature of
clinical work necessitates a considerable amount of one-on-one
contact and supervision and thus limits clinician student loads.
A typical clinician will generate only about one-third as many
student credit-hours as do regular "stand-up" lecturers who
generally have much larger classes. 3 9 A relatively comprehensive
law school clinical program would probably require at least two
civil clinicians and one criminal clinician, as well as some
supporting adjuncts and other staff persons. It would probably
only service on a regular basis about one current full-time regular
faculty member's "worth" of students, in terms of student credit-
hours generated. That would mean a net loss of at least two
faculty slots withdrawn from elective courses, unless the law
school catalogue. UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO FACULTY OF LAW, FACULTY OF LAW HANDBOOK
40-41 (1996).
35. Id.
36. Under New Zealand law for a person to be "qualfled for admission as a
barrister and solicitor" that person must hold an L.L.B. degree and have passed the
Institute of Professional Legal Studies course. Law Practitioners Act, 1982, § 44(1)
(1992) (N.Z.); COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION, REVIEW OF PRACTICAL LEGAL TRAINING IN
NEW ZEALAND 10 (1995); UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO FACULTY OF LAW, FACULTY OF LAW
HANDBOOK 33 (1996).
37. See generally COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 36, at 37-55.
38. See, e.g., D. Craig Lewis, Reflections from an Outsider, 3 CANT. L. REV.
347(1988).
39. Of course, the actual number of student contact hours provided by
clinical faculty may equal or even exceed that provided by regular classes, since
clinical supervision obviously involves much more direct contact with students than
do most lecture-oriented classes.
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school could obtain sufficient additional funding from its parent
university for two new faculty slots. Such law school faculty
expansion is unlikely to occur in the near term, as New Zealand is
currently undergoing a program of steadily contracting state
support for its public institutions in general and its universities in
particular. Of course, a less ambitious clinical program that
relied primarily upon simulations and externships could provide
some clinical opportunities for students with a lesser commitment
of faculty time.
Second, it is difficult to recruit good clinicians. To have the
background to be an effective clinical instructor a person needs to
be a good lawyer with probably at least five years of experience in
practice, be able to work well with students, and have an
"academic" orientation to law. Such broadly talented people are
hard to lure away from their (usually) successful private or public
practices.
Third, it can be difficult to fully integrate clinicians into the
regular faculty. Clinicians tend to be very practice-oriented and
are also busy supervising students. They therefore usually
(although not always) cannot do as good or as much theoretical
scholarship, conventionally defmed, as mainstream faculty.
There is a constant controversy within U.S. law faculties
concerning whether to subject clinicians to the normal
publication standards applied to other faculty members for tenure
and promotion purposes or instead to apply more lenient
standards or utilize non-tenure fixed-term contracts. If one of
these latter options is chosen, the problem is presented as to how
to avoid having clinicians regarded by other faculty as second-
class citizens and how to handle requests from clinicians who
may wish later in their careers to shift to a non-clinical classroom
teaching and research role.
Finally, a law school clinic can potentially provoke some
unpleasant conflicts between the law school and certain members
of the local bar. A full-scale clinical program is somewhat like a
law firm with fifteen to twenty lawyers, in terms of the number of
cases taken. Large law firms will not usually offer any objections
to the establishment of a local law school clinic. In fact, large
firms tend to favor such clinics, because they provide good
training for the firms' prospective new recruits and are not
regarded as competition for the firms' particular clientele.
However, one must consider that pro bono clinics may well take
some potential clients away from small firms and sole
practitioners, who obviously will have trouble competing with free
legal services of the same nature as they are attempting to provide
for compensation. This potential conflict is not a significant
problem for the many U.S. law schools which are located in the
midst of relatively large concentrations of population and lawyers.
46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
It does, however, pose more serious concerns in the New Zealand
context, where the density of population is much less. In
particular, two of the five New Zealand law schools are located in
small metropolitan areas of approximately 100,000 persons
each.40 These communities may each have only a few hundred
practicing attorneys, many of whom are engaged in solo or small
firm general practice and may be directly impacted by the clinical
provision of pro bono services on a significant scale. This conflict
can be mitigated, of course, if clinics make special efforts to
represent primarily those clients whose particular disputes or
financial limitations make them unattractive to the private bar
and who would thereby be represented inadequately, if at all, in
the absence of clinical representation.
C. Economic Analysis of Law Electives
A third significant difference between legal education in the
two countries is the complete lack of course offerings in law-and-
economics in New Zealand law schools, 41 as compared to their
relative ubiquity in U.S. law school curricula.42 This situation is
40. The University of Otago Faculty of Law is located in Dunedin, which has
a metropolitan area population of approximately 114,000. Waikago University
School of Law is located in Hamilton, which has a metropolitan area population of
approximately 156,000. STATIsnCs NEW ZEALAND, NEW ZEALAND IN PROFILE (1996).
41. The law schools of the Universities of Auckland, Canterbury, and
Waikato do not even list such a course in their catalogues. Victoria University of
Wellington has had a "Law and Economics" law faculty elective listed in its catalogue
in recent years. but that course was not offered during the 1995 or 1996 academic
years. Similarly, the University of Otago Faculty of Law has had a "Law and
Economics" law faculty elective listed in its catalogue for some time, but that course
has not been offered for at least the past several years.
Several of these universities offer "Economic Analysis of Law" electives elsewhere
in their curricula, but these courses are targeted at economics majors with strong
economics backgrounds, and are taken by relatively few law students. For example,
the Economics Department of the University of Canterbury had 22 students enrolled
in its Economic Analysis of Law elective in 1996, but only one of these students was
majoring in law. Interviews with Alan Woodfleld, Department of Economics,
University of Canterbury.
Such courses are also offered by the Economics Department at the University of
Auckland, and by the School of Management Studies at Waikato at both the
graduate and undergraduate level, but with similarly quite small law student
enrollments. For example, at Waikato only one out of 11 students enrolled in the
graduate elective in 1996, and no more than six out of 45 students enrolled in the
undergraduate elective in 1995, were law students. Interviews with Peter
Fitzsimons. School of Law, University of Waikato (May 1996).
42. Of the 153 listed law professors who teach law and economics courses,
78 are currently teaching the subject. AsSOcIAnON OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, AALS
DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 1995-96. 1153-54 (1995). This information understates
the number of law professors qualified to teach the subject, and probably the number
of courses offered as well, since it omits many noted law and economics scholars
including, among others, Henry Hansmann, Mark Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, and
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puzzling given the political developments in New Zealand since
the implementation of "Rogernomics" social policies beginning in
1984. In that year, David Lange of the Labour Party was elected
as Prime Minister, and with Roger Dougus as the principal
architest of change the government subsequently repudiated
longstanding social welfare state policies favored by earlier
regimes. New Zealand has moved quite dramatically over the past
twelve years to embrace market-oriented, efficiency-enhancing
"user pays" policies in many areas of social life. A law-and-
economics course has as its primary objective helping law
students develop greater facility in exactly the forms of economic
reasoning and vocabulary that are now the standard conceptual
framework and language used by top policymakers in that
country. Lawyers there now need to be able to converse fluently
in economic terminology to represent their clients effectively in
some fora and also need to be equipped to reflect critically upon
the assumptions that underly using market competition and
economic efficiency as central normative criteria. One would
think that the New Zealand law schools would have made it a
high priority to offer such courses, but they have not. It is a
major gap in their curricula when compared to the opportunities
generally available to U.S. law students in this regard.
I believe that this deficiency stems from a combination of
factors, including financial constraints that make it difficult to
hire qualified teachers for these courses, resistance within law
faculties to embrace courses that some faculty perceive to have a
right-wing bias and that displace traditional legal classifications
with economic concepts, and resistance from economics
departments that fear losing students to such electives.
First of all, the New Zealand education system is not
currently producing a pool of potential law faculty candidates who
have the ideal background of a law degree, a Ph.D. degree in
economics, and teaching experience in both fields that best
qualifies one to teach these broad-ranging and pedagogically
challenging interdisciplinary courses. None of that country's
universities offers a joint J.D./Ph.D. or L.L.M./Ph.D. program
that would allow a motivated person to obtain both of those
credentials in as little as five or six years of post-graduate study-
as do, for example, a number of the leading U.S. universities. If
one seeks to obtain both of these graduate degrees in New
Zealand, one must complete the two degree programs separately
and sequentially, which is a long-term and expensive
undertaking. As a result, very few New Zealand residents have
George Priest. Such courses are quite often titled the "Economic Analysis of Law"
rather than "Law and Economics."
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obtained both credentials. Moreover, those who have done so
may be reluctant to accept academic appointments in New
Zealand, since they generally have attractive private sector
opportunities that offer substantially higher initial compensation
than entry-level academic positions and promise better long-term
prospects for amassing significant wealth.
For at least the next few years, therefore, the faculty best
qualified to teach these law-and-economics courses would most
likely have to be imported, probably largely from the United
States, since it is the only nation where the pool of qualified
candidates is of significant size. U.S. law schools, however, offer
compensation packages that are much more generous than those
provided by New Zealand law schools to faculty of comparable
expertise and experience. 43  Such imported faculty would
therefore be quite expensive to hire if internationally competitive
salaries had to be paid.
Moreover, in recent years, the New Zealand government has
been increasingly subjecting its universities to the same sort of
efficiency-oriented restructuring that much of the rest of the
society has already undergone. The universities are thus
currently caught in an uncomfortable financial squeeze. On one
side, they face a continuing gradual reduction of government
subsidies for education, which must be replaced by higher
student tuition fees and other sources of revenue that can be
developed. On the other side, there is student resentment of
recent sharp tuition increases and growing resistance to further
significant increases, as evidenced by vigorous public
demonstrations and other forms of student protest.
Law schools are certainly not exempt from these increasingly
severe financial constraints, and it will be a challenge to their
43. U.S. law schools currently pay entry-level salaries roughly in the range of
$50,000 to $65,000 to candidates with such strong interdisciplinary qualifications.
The overall median full-time law professor salary in the United States, all ranks
combined, is now approximately $83,000. OFFICE OF THE CONSULTANT ON LEGAL
EDUCATION TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CONSULTANT'S DIGEST 6 (1995). In New
Zealand. in contrast, a typical law school faculty member of Senior Lecturer rank
(roughly comparable to a tenured Associate Professor in the United States) would
receive an annual salary of NZ $65,000, or approximately $45,000 when measured
in U.S. currency.
Moreover, the supplementary retirement contributions generally paid by U.S.
universities to the accounts of their faculty members are quite generous by New
Zealand standards, and Americans have further opportunities for making deductible
personal contributions to tax-deferred retirement savings accounts not available in
New Zealand. SMU, for example, contributes annually to a faculty member's tax-
deferred retirement account a sum equal to 10% of his before-tax income, so long as
the faculty member also makes the maximum personal tax-deductible contribution
allowed by law (5% of before-tax income) to that account. No comparable
opportunities for tax avoidance are available under New Zealand law.
[Vol. 30:31
19971 COMPARING UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND LEGAL EDUCATION 49
deans and faculties simply to maintain their existing staffing and
programs unscathed in such an environment. Under these
circumstances, bringing in expensive specialists from abroad to
offer new law-and-economics electives would be difficult, even if
there were fairly widespread support for such an initiative.
Moreover, supporters of such hiring are likely to encounter
opposition to the introduction of law-and-economics courses into
law school curricula based upon grounds other than their
possible impacts upon law school budgets. Some of this
opposition may arise within the law faculties themselves and be
brought to bear upon faculty and deans in their curricular
decision-making. In addition, further opposition may come from
economics departments located in the university business
schools, making itself felt more at the higher levels of university
governance than at the faculty level.
Doubtless there are some legal academics in New Zealand
who would oppose adding law-and-economics electives to their
curriculum, despite their judgment that those courses would be of
some value to their students, simply because they are not
convinced that such courses will be of sufficient value to justify
their inclusion at the expense of other current offerings or
potential curricular additions. However, given the arguments
noted above that can be made for the special relevance and value
of economic analysis-oriented electives, I doubt that such
reluctant opposition based on the perceived greater value of other
potential curricular offerings is very widespread or intensely felt.
I suspect that most of the law faculty resistance to introducing
such courses, apart from that based upon the previously noted
financial concerns, is of a more "political" character.
There is a fairly widespread perception among New Zealand
academics that the conventional framework of assumptions and
values through which the economic analysis of law is generally
conducted has a strong status quo bias, and that its primary
normative criterion of wealth maximization over-emphasizes the
efficiency advantages of markets and unduly minimizes their
distributional shortcomings. Persons with such convictions tend
to regard law-and-economics analyses as being of doubtful
validity, viewing them largely as rhetorical ploys invoked by those
toward the conservative pole of the political spectrum to further
entrench their vested interests.
44
44. I will not offer in this short essay any opinion on the merits of this critical
position. I will say that my experience Is that people's views in this area are usually
deeply grounded in their basic Ideological orientation and are quite resistant to
change through argumentation and evidence. I have published several recent
articles that address in various ways some of the heated controversies surrounding
the foundational assumptions of the economic analysis of law. See, e.g., Gregory S.
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One would expect persons who are generally opposed to
giving greater sway to market forces as social co-ordination
mechanisms also to have reservations about adding such courses
to the curriculum. The law-and-economics framework certainly
emphasizes the power of market forces to bring about efficient
resource allocations, and highlights the inefficiencies and other
unintended adverse consequences that often result from
governmental efforts to supersede market mechanisms or
redistribute wealth. Critics of such courses may feel-with some
justification-that their favored proposals for various forms of
state intervention or redistribution of wealth are more likely to
receive favourable political action if they are debated in the
traditional legal language of "rights," "duties," and "equitable
concerns" rather than if assessed by the criteria of economic
efficiency and their impact on economic growth and international
trade competitiveness. These dissenters may therefore elect to
oppose curricular innovations, such as the introduction of law-
and-economics courses, that would serve to encourage such a
change in the discourse through which social policy is made.
45
The other potential source of political opposition to such
electives within the university community stems largely from the
more prosaic grounds of departmental turf and budgets. Under
the current framework of state funding of university education in
New Zealand, school and departmental budgets are linked,
Crespi, Does the Chicago School Need to Expand Its Curriculum?, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
(forthcoming 1997); Gregory S. Crespi. Putting the Chicago School Debate In Proper
Perspective, 22 L.J. SOC. INQUIRY (Forthcoming 1997); Gregory S. Crespi, Teaching
the New Law and Economics, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 713 (1994); Gregory S. Crespi,
MicroeconomIcs Made (Too) Easy: A Casebook Approach to Teaching Law and
Economics, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 1560 (1993); Gregory S. Crespi, Market Magic: Can the
Invisible Hand St-angle Bigotry?. 72 B. U. L. REV. 991 (1992) (reviewing RIcHARD A.
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1992)); Gregory S. Crespi, The Mid-LIfe Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement-
Confronting the Problems of Nonfa1sflabillty and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 231 (1991).
There exists voluminous literature concerning the proper role of economics in
legal education and analysis. Two major symposia collections published in the early
1980s provide a particularly good introduction to this literature. See Symposium,
The Place of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1983); Symposium
on Efficiency as a Legal Concern. 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980).
45. Such essentially political opposition may not alrays be articulated in
such a candid fashion. The current financial constraints pressing upon legal
education in New Zealand conveniently provide a plausible and facially neutral
ground on which to oppose the addition of such electives. Those faculty that have
essentially political objections to such courses, but who for whatever reasons are
reluctant to risk transmuting a routine faculty curricular debate into a potentially
divisive clash over first principles, can thereby disingenuously invoke financial
constraints as a basis for their opposition and thus avoid having openly to frame the
question in more political and controversial terms.
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sometimes quite directly and immediately, to the size of course
enrollments. A law-and-economics elective taught by a professor
with full academic credentials in law could well prove to be quite
attractive to many students, including, most obviously, the
numerous students in New Zealand pursuing joint law/commerce
majors, as well as economics majors or business majors with
some interest in legal questions. Many of the students enrolling
in such courses would likely do so in lieu of taking an additional
economics elective, particularly a law-and-economics course
offered elsewhere in the university by a faculty member who lacks
the advantage of formal legal training. This shift in enrollment
patterns could cost the economics departments (and their
respective parent business schools) a significant amount of state
funding. One might therefore expect economics departments to
be inclined to take a dim view of such courses being offered by
law faculties. This is particularly likely to be the case if those
courses are being taught by law faculty without Ph.D. degrees in
economics and if an alternative economic analysis of law course is
offered elsewhere in the university by a fully credentialed
economist. Under those circumstances, the opposition could be
articulated in principled fashion in terms of departmental
responsibility for maintaining appropriate standards of excellence
in instruction taking place in their discipline, rather than in the
more self-serving and less persuasive rhetoric of departmental
budget impacts.
My conclusion, therefore, is that there are at least two
significant reasons why none of the law schools in New Zealand
are now offering law-and-economics courses despite the likely
popularity of such courses and their obvious value to students.
First, it would be a relatively expensive undertaking to offer these
courses at a time when law school budgets are very tight.
Second, there would probably be significant opposition of an
essentially political character to such courses that would arise
both within and outside of law faculties, although such opponents
might be less than fully candid as to their true concerns. I have
written elsewhere about how these obstacles might be
overcome.
46
D. Staffing of Required Courses
Finally, there are very different approaches followed in the
two countries concerning the staffmg of the basic law school
required courses. I believe that the United States approach here
46. See Gregory Crespi, Filling a Gap in New Zealand Legal Educatiorn The
Economic Analysis of Law, 8 OTAGo L. REv. 559 (1996).
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is superior, although I recognize that this is a complicated
comparison involving many factors and that reasonable persons
may reach different conclusions.
SMU follows the typical United States approach to teaching
these basic courses. SMU divides its 250 first-year students
taking the required courses into 3 sections of 80 to 85 students
each. Each section is assigned to a single professor for each
required class, such as contracts, torts, etc., and that professor
gives all the lectures, prepares and grades his own examination,
and schedules and conducts any supplementary review sessions
or tutorials she deems appropriate to hold.
In New Zealand, in contrast, the law schools generally
schedule only one large lecture section for each required course
and assign approximately three faculty members to that section,
each of whom lecture to the section for only part of the year.47
Most law school faculty members also conduct one or more
weekly small-group tutorial sections associated with one of the
required courses. The three main faculty members taking
responsibility for a large lecture section provide the other faculty
with tutorial support materials and jointly prepare and grade the
final examinations.
The U.S. approach seems to have two major advantages.
First, and most obviously, it allows for much smaller lecture
classes, making more class discussion and feedback possible. It
is almost impossible to have any meaningful class discussion or
engage in Socratic inquiry when there are upwards of 200 or more
students in the room, and the New Zealand instructor has no real
choice but to regularly lecture for the full class period.
Secondly, and to me more importantly, the U.S. approach
allows and encourages each professor teaching a required course
to define his own subject matter coverage and develop his own
pedagogical approach, without being subjected to the severe
constraints of having to coordinate his choice and sequencing of
topics, his teaching style, and his examination format with two
other colleagues. The required courses are taught in a manner
comparable to upper-level electives, albeit with generally larger
class sizes. The diversity of content and pedagogical style that
best befits legal education in a postmodern, multicultural world is
thereby encouraged and preserved in the crucial beginning
courses where students are particularly attentive to their
instructors and are inclined to absorb and internalize the implicit
norms of the profession as communicated by those instructors.
The U.S. approach also enables each professor to present her
47. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO FACULTY OF LAW, FACULTY OF LAW HANDBOOK
10-11 (1996).
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course in a comprehensive and integrated manner from beginning
to end, which avoids the inevitable gaps and redundancies of
team-teaching and gives students the opportunity to grasp her
full, overarching concept of the subject matter and its relation to
other fields.
I concede that there are several advantages to the New
Zealand approach of one large section and associated small
tutorial groups. First of all, it requires less work of each of the
three main professors than is required of a single instructor
under the U.S. approach, since each professor only has to lecture
for part of the year. However, this time savings is at least
partially offset for the faculty as a whole by the substantial added
tutorial responsibilities involved in this framework. Another
advantage is that the New Zealand professors can specialize to a
greater extent in those aspects of the subject they will teach in
their portion of the lectures, which should help them develop a
deeper understanding of those areas, thereby both improving
their teaching and aiding them in their related research and
scholarship efforts. The weekly tutorial meetings connected with
each large lecture section, at least in theory if not always in
practice, do provide a helpful small-group discussion environment
and close faculty interaction that is often not available to U.S. law
students outside of their first-year legal writing sections or
occasional upper-level seminar electives. Finally, if a student
does not respond well to the particular pedagogical style of a
professor teaching a large section, he does not have to endure
that professor for an entire semester or year under this approach.
The New Zealand approach to course staffing thus does have its
merits. On balance, however, I think the curricular diversity and
pedagogical advantages I have noted of having several smaller
sections each taught completely by one faculty member outweigh
the advantages of the New Zealand approach.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, these specific contrasts between the two systems as
to admissions policy, clinical education, law-and-economics
electives, and course staffing further emphasize the different
possibilities and constraints of graduate versus undergraduate
education and of low-cost versus high-cost education. If
admission to a program of law school study is an internal
undergraduate affair taking place within a single university, then
consistent pre-requisite programs which provide excellent
admission criteria can be utilized. Graduate schools generally do
not have this luxury of imposing meaningful standardized
admissions criteria. On the other hand, administrators of
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graduate programs need not concern themselves very much with
the inter-departmental turf conflicts that pervade and complicate
undergraduate education. Finally, a well-financed legal education
system can allow schools to make decisions concerning clinical
programs and advanced elective offerings primarily on an
academic basis rather than on budgetary grounds.
The differential availability of law-and-economics courses in
the law school setting across the two systems can be partially
explained by the financial and turf conflict factors noted above.
However, the lack of such electives in New Zealand legal
education appears to stem at least as much from broad
differences in social attitudes within law faculties and academia
generally concerning the merits of utilizing "economic" criteria for
social decision-making than from differences in the structure of
legal education.
The different approaches taken in staffing required courses
do not appear to be necessary consequences of the underlying
structural features of the two systems, but seem more to reflect
an uncritical replication of the practices following elsewhere in
both nations' university systems. The use of large lecture
sections and associated small tutorial groups is characteristic of
introductory undergraduate courses in both New Zealand and the
United States, while it is not utilized for graduate-level education
in either country.
U.S. legal education is regularly subjected to sharp criticism
by domestic observers. 48 When it is compared to the quite
different contours of the legal education that is offered in New
Zealand, however, it seems clear that the U.S. system is "better,"
at least in the limited sense of being better financed and providing
a broader range of learning opportunities to a better educated
entering student body. Moreover, the performance of the New
Zealand legal education system is generally representative of
those of developed cunries which have undergraduate-oriented
legal education systems. It is thus hard to avoid the conclusion
that the U.S. legal education system (along with the similarly
structured Canadian legal education system), for all of its flaws, is
probably the freest in existence.
However, a brief comparative analysis such as presented here
suggests that this excellence is achieved at a relatively high social
cost, both in the narrow economic terms of the resources
consumed per graduate produced and in terms of the more
intangible social costs stemming from the contribution that a
large, highly stratified network of expensive, elite, graduate-level
educational institutions makes toward reproducing and
48. See supra note 1.
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reinforcing a stratified social class structure. Most of the current
U.S. debate concerning issues of legal education focuses upon
what marginal changes should be made in, among other things,
core curricula, legal writing programs, skills training courses, and
loan repayment schemes to improve an already outstanding
educational system.4 9 This debate is grounded on the implicit
premise that the existing overall level of resource commitment to
legal education and the current provision of that education
through a highly stratified system of graduate law schools are
appropriate foundational principles that need not be called into
serious question. A comparison of our approach with that
followed in New Zealand, however, focuses attention upon those
premises and raises troubling questions as to their validity.
I would therefore suggest that a relatively overlooked thread
in the debate concerning legal education reform be given greater
emphasis. I think that perhaps the most important issue
currently facing U.S. legal education is the difficult question of
whether the current level of excellence has been obtained at too
high a cost, both in terms of the possible alternative uses of the
resources now devoted to legal education and the problematic
effects of that stratified educational system on our overall social
structure. This question has received relatively little serious
attention to date. This is perhaps partly because most of the
informed critics of legal education have to some extent a vested
interest in its perpetuation as a relatively well-financed, graduate-
school enterprise. It may also be, however, that many of these
critics have simply not given serious consideration to the
relatively low-cost, undergraduate-oriented alternative followed in
New Zealand and elsewhere. More attention needs to be paid to
the possibility that, despite the obvious social value of good legal
services, the United States might be better off, all things
considered, if it had a "worse" legal education system.
Given this possibility, more thought should be given by
reformers to formulating and assessing possible alternative legal
education mechanisms of a less expensive and more egalitarian
nature. Such a comprehensive effort is beyond the scope of this
short article. However, let me offer in passing a few brief
comments and suggestions.
One obvious approach would be to create additional legal
education opportunities for students that are based upon the
legal education model adopted by New Zealand and most of the
rest of the world. In order to move significantly in this direction,
it would be necessary to first press for relaxation of existing ABA
law school accreditation requirements and state bar admission
49. See supra notes 2-4 & 7.
56 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
standards so as to allow more enterprising colleges and
universities to offer accredited four-year (or perhaps five-year)
undergraduate law study programs that would qualify their
graduates to sit for bar examinations and be admitted to practice
if successful. The ABA, under strong pressure by the federal
government5 0 and by unaccredited law schools 5 l to modify its
accreditation practices and standards to mitigate their
anticompetitive consequences, has recently made significant
changes in those practices and standards5 2 to conform them to
the terms of a consent decree reached with the Department of
Justice in 1995.53 Those changes, however, fall well short of
permitting the accreditation of undergraduate legal education
programs.
Another option along the same general lines of relaxing
restrictive educational and bar admissions requirements would be
to encourage universities to provide concentrated, Internet- or
video tape-based one or two year correspondence legal education
programs to college graduates who may wish to become attorneys,
but who are for financial or other reasons not interested in
conventional classroom law school training, and to modify the
ABA accreditation and state bar licensing standards to endorse
these programs. Some of the steps taken by the Massachusetts
School of Law and other unaccredited programs to offer lower cost
graduate legal training are clear moves in this direction5 4 which
may lead to further steps if the ABA opposition can be overcome.
Such new vehicles for providing legal education would, of course,
have to be accompanied by more comprehensive governmental,
50. The ABA on June 27, 1995 entered into a consent decree with the
Department of Justice in which it agreed to significantly alter Its accreditation
practices and standards with regard to salaries and compensation and transfer
credits for students from unaccredited schools. Steven A. Holmes, Justice Dept.
Forces Changes in Law School Administration, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1995, at Al. A
Final Judgment enjoining the ABA from collecting compensation data and using for
accreditation purposes, from refusing to accredit proprietary schools, and from
placing certain restrictions on transfer credits was entered in that proceeding on
June 25, 1996. Legal Notice, A.B.A. J., October 1996, at 133, 133-36.
51. The Massachusetts School of Law, denied accreditation by the ABA in
1993, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the ABA in 1994 alleging that the
accreditation criteria are anticompetitive. Massachusetts School of Law v. American
Bar Ass'n, 846 F. Supp. 374, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1994). That suit was dismissed on
August 29, 1996 by the granting of the ABA's motion for summary judgment. Mark
Hansen, Judge Rules ABA Has Right to Accredit, A.B.A. J., November 1996, at 32,
32.
52. James Podgers, House Oks Law School Standards, A.B.A. J., October
1996, at 107, 107.
53. See supra note 51.
54. See, for example, the discussion of the Massachusetts School of Law
program contained in Debbie Goldberg, Low-Cost Law School Tests Bar Association
Standards. WASH. POST, April 11, 1995, at A3.
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bar association, or other private mechanisms than now exist for
assuring the quality of legal services and disseminating to
consumers of legal services accurate information as to the nature
and extent of the training undergone by the attorneys they may
elect to hire.
Legal education reformers in the United States can thus learn
a great deal from the New Zealand experiences. That Experience
suggests a number of alternatives to the reforms commonly
discussed. One must recognize, however, that proposals for such
dramatic and far-reaching changes in our approach to legal
education and professional qualification would doubtless generate
intense political controversy, as is indicated by the ABA and
practitioner opposition to even relatively modest relaxation of
accreditation criteria. The opposition would almost certainly be
expressed primarily in terms of the need to uphold high
professional standards of training and conduct to protect the
public from incompetent representation. Of course, that
opposition would also be energized in large part by the economic
interest of existing members of the bar in limiting competition for
their clients from lower-cost providers of legal services. The
debate of such proposals would likely resemble in many ways the
controversies that surrounded the initial development of the
graduate-school model of legal education in the United States in
the early 20th century, which took place against the background
of efforts by significant numbers of recent Irish and continental
European immigrants to qualify for legal practice, and thus
encroach upon formerly largely Anglo-Saxon preserves."5
55. STEVENS, supra note 18, at 172-204.
